In Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain (2009) 10 SCC 415, Supreme Court held that an order of waiving the statutory requirements can be passed only by Supreme Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. The said power is not vested with any other court.


In Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. K. Parasaran & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2687, Supreme Court has observed as under:- “No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner he wishes. However, access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions.”

In Jai Singh v. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 898, Supreme Court while dealing with a similar issue held that a litigant cannot pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same matter at the same time. This judgment has subsequently been approved by Supreme Court in principle but distinguished on facts in Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar AIR 1996 SC 122; and Arunima Baruah v. Union of India (2007) 6 SCC 120.


In Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal (2003) 8 SCC 745, where Supreme Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue".


The President has assented to the Personal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2010 on 31st August, 2010 and it is published in the Gazette of India as Act 30 of 2010 on 1st September, 2010. The Act has amended the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.
The Act is aimed at bringing gender equality in the matter of guardianship under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and in the matter of giving in or taking in adoption a son or a daughter by father or mother under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.
Under Clause (b) section 19 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, mother was not included as Guardian along with father. The Law Commission of India in its Eighty-third Report on “the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and certain provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956”, vide paragraph 6.83, had inter alia recommended amendments in clause (b) of section 19 of the said Act to include mother along with the father for the purpose of removing the gender inequality. The recommendations has been accepted and implemented by the enactment.
Clause (c) of section 8 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 incapacitates a married woman from taking in adoption merely on the basis of her marital status and is discriminatory in nature. Therefore, section 8 has been amended to give similar right to a female Hindu, irrespective of her marital status, as that of a male Hindu.
Similarly, sub-section (2) and (3) of section 9 curtails the right of mother to give in adoption if father is alive or is of sound mind or has not renounced the world completely and finally. The rights of father and mother under sub-sections (2) and (3) are discriminatory in nature. Therefore, section 9 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 has been suitably amended to give similar right to a female Hindu.


In Sarup Singh and Anr. Vs. UOI and Anr. – Decided on Nov 25 2010 The Hon’ble Judges of Supreme court: Justice Mukundakam Sharma and Justice Anil R. Dave, delivering judgement in Civil Appeal No. 3568 of 2005 quoted following judgements of supreme court
In Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (deceased) Through Lrs. v. Jasjit Singh and Others reported in (1993) 2 SCC 507 this Court stated thus: "18. It is settled law that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction on the subject-matter or on the grounds on which the decree made which goes to the root of its jurisdiction or lacks inherent jurisdiction is a coram non judice. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to pass decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party.............."

In the case of Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. and Another reported in (1999) 3 SCC 500 this Court described the scope of Section 152, C.P.C. thus: "6. Section 152 CPC provides for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders of errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The exercise of this power contemplates the correction of mistakes by the court of its ministerial actions and does not contemplate of passing effective judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order. The settled position of law is that after the passing of the judgment, decree or order, the court or the tribunal becomes functus officio and thus being not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments, decrees and orders earlier passed. The corrections contemplated are of correcting only accidental omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the court while passing the judgment, decree or order. The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the case is beyond the scope of Section 152 for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is to file appeal or review application. It implies that the section cannot be pressed into service to correct an omission which is intentional, however erroneous that may be. It has been noticed that the courts below have been liberally construing and applying the province of Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC even after passing of effective orders in the lis pending before them. No court can, under the cover of the aforesaid sections, modify, alter or add to the terms of its original judgment, decree or order.............."
There are number of decisions of this Court wherein it has also been held that a wrong judgment given by the High Court cannot be taken as precedence for perpetrating such wrong. In the case of State of Haryana and Others v. Ram Kumar Mann reported in (1997) 3 SCC 321 held as follows: - "3. The question, therefore, is whether the view taken by the High Court is correct in law. It is seen that the respondent had voluntarily resigned from the service and the resignation was accepted by the Government on 18-5-1982. On and from that date, the relationship of employer and the employee between the respondent and the State ceased and thereafter he had no right, whatsoever, either to claim the post or a right to withdraw his resignation which had already become effective by acceptance on 18-5-1982...The doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence of an enforceable right. He was discriminated and denied equality as some similarly situated persons had been given the same relief. Article 14 would apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any rational basis or relationship in that behalf. The respondent has no right, whatsoever and cannot be given the relief wrongly given to them, i.e., benefit of withdrawal of resignation. The High Court was wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that there was invidious discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to perpetrate, an employee, after committing mis-appropriation of money, is dismissed from service and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is reinstated into the service. Can a similarly circumstanced person claim equality under Article 14 for reinstatement? The answer is obviously "No".. A wrong decision by the Government does not give a right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two wrongs can never make a right. Under these circumstances, the High Court was clearly wrong in directing reinstatement of the respondent by a mandamus with all consequential benefits."

In the case of State of Bihar and Others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Another reported in (2000) 9 SCC 94 this Court held thus: - "30. The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be enforced in a negative manner... Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High Court. The Court observed: (SCC p. 465, para 9) "Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination."
Again in Secy., Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain reported in 1996 (7) SCALE 135 this Court considered the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and reiterated its earlier position regarding the concept of equality holding: (SCC pp. 51-52, para 28) "Suffice it to hold that the illegal allotment founded upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal premise to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or perpetuate such illegal order, nor could it be legalised. In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to perpetuate the illegalities. Thus considered, we hold that the High Court was clearly in error in directing the appellants to allot the land to the respondents."


Smt. Lalitha Sastry Vs. State of Karnataka ILR 2008 Kar 4520 Honourable Judges: N. Kumar, J. Date of Judgement: 22/09/2008 From the aforesaid circular it is clear the Government is now convinced that an opportunity should be given to all those alleged encroachers of Government land before any proceedings are initiated under Section 192A of the Act. In fact it stipulates a procedure under which a show cause notice is to be given calling upon those alleged encroachers to file their objections within 15 days. If no objections are received authorities are called upon to visit the spot, conduct a Mahazar in the presence of the villagers, obtain their signatures and thereafter to initiate criminal proceedings if they are satisfied that there is encroachment. In the event of alleged encroachers producing documents to examine the same and only in the event of the said documents are found to be fabricated or duplicate, to initiate proceedings under Section 192A of the Act. In fact the said procedure contemplated by the Government satisfy the requirement of principles of natural justice, an opportunity is given to these persons to realise whether they have occupied a Government land and if they are convinced to surrender possession to avoid criminal prosecution.


Boramma Vs. Srinivasa and Others 2009 (2) KarLJ 385 Honourable Judges: K. Ramanna, J. Date of Judgement: 09/01/2009, Regular Second Appeal No. 381 of 2002, Of course, the revenue documents disclose that since from 1981-82 the name of plaintiff 2 and plaintiff 1 appear in revenue records as possessor of suit lands. But these revenue records cannot be termed as title deeds to confer on them the right of ownership over suit properties. The plaintiffs have not placed on record any other deed or document to prove the source of title. Further, they have not disclosed any particulars for change of khata in the name of plaintiffs. No iota of evidence is placed on record to show why her name is entered in the revenue records and how she become owner of the suit property and whether there was any consideration passed therein or the same was by way of any family arrangement. Such things has not been pleaded nor proved before Court. Mere entry in the revenue records will not confer any title to the plaintiffs and on the basis of the said entries, the plaintiffs cannot be termed as owners of suit properties. State of Himachal Pradesh v Keshav Ram and Others, AIR 1997 SC 2181: (1996)11 SCC 257: ILR 1998 Kar. 1 (SC), it is held as under: "Entry in a revenue record or papers by no stretch of imagination can form the basis for declaration of title". Further, in case of Smt. Sawami v Smt. Inder Kaur and Others, AIR 1996 SC 2823: (1996)6 SCC 223 wherein it is held thus: "Mutation of name in revenue records, effect, held, does not create or extinguish the title nor has any presumptive value on title, it only entities the person concerned to pay land revenue".


L. A. Krishnappa Vs. State of Karnataka and Others 2009 (2) KarLJ 697 Date of Judgement: 23/01/2009 Honourable Judges: Anand Byrareddy, J. The Counsel would place reliance on the judgments of this Court in P. Bhimachar v State of Mysore and Others, 1966(2) Mys. L.J. 184 (DB), wherein a Division Bench of this Court has held that pot kharab portion of the land is included in the ownership of the occupant. A similar view is taken in Saudagar Rasul Khan v State of Mysore and Others, ILR 1973 Kar. 56, wherein it is held that kharab land is so-called because it is not cultivable and is a classification made for the purposes of revenue exemption. Rule 21(2)(a) is thus a provision relating to the exemption from the payment of land revenue and has no relevance for assuming that the pot kharab portion is land not included in the occupancy, and that it belongs to the Government. From this point of view also the demand made for the payment of the market value on the pot kharab is unauthorised.

While the Government Pleader on the other hand, would seek to justify the action of the State Government on the basis of the circulars namely Circular No. RD 136 LGS 93, dated 16-9-1994 as well as the Circular No. RD 137 LQW 2001, dated 17-6-2003 whereunder an opinion of the law department is expressed to the effect that kharab lands are Government lands and therefore, the question of acquiring those lands does not arise and hence, there is no scope for making any payments to the landlords in respect of kharab land. Reliance is also placed on a circular dated 12-5-2004, wherein it is clarified that if 'A' kharab land if granted by the Competent Authority, it would only then become part and parcel of Hiduvali land of the landlord. It is contended by the Government Pleader that the ownership of "A" kharab land always vests with the Government unless it is granted to the landowner by the Competent Authority. And therefore, would submit that the demand made is in order.

It is not in dispute that in the present circumstances, the demand made is in respect of pot kharab(a) land. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, there is no distinction made between an arable portion of land and an unarable portion of land under Rule 107 for purposes of levy of fine for conversion of land for non-agricultural use. The reliance sought to be placed by the State on the circulars which are mere clarifications based on the opinions expressed by its law department would not override the express provisions of law, which have been referred to herein above. There is no indication that there is a distinction between an arable portion of land and unarable portion of land. The provisions of Section 95 relating to conversion of agricultural land for other purposes does not also make any such distinction. Hence, the State Government seeking to interpret the provisions in order to obtain higher revenue would not be tenable. It is only in respect of pot kharab(b) lands, it could be said that the State Government can claim the same as Government lands. Insofar as pot kharab(a) lands are concerned, the Division Bench decision referred to above is categorical on this aspect and that has attained finality. There is no other manner in which the provisions could be interpreted.


In a decision of High court of Karnataka in case of S. Venkata Reddy Vs. Mulabagalappa and Others Reported in 2009 (3) KarLJ 294 Decided by Justice Arali Nagaraj, J. Date of Judgement: 28/01/2009 Regular Second Appeal No. 929 of 2002, It is observed that "It is not in dispute that the said land was granted to Mulabagalappa for the reason that he happened to be a member of scheduled caste. Therefore, the mortgage of the said land by the defendant-grantee in favour of the plaintiff authorising the plaintiff to enjoy usufructs was clearly in violation of the provisions of Section 4 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978.

It is held by this Court in the case of R.H. Ramakrishnaiah v The Deputy Commissioner, Shimoga District and Others, 2000(2) Kar. L.J. Sh. N. 21, that usufructuary mortgage of the granted land amounts to transfer and if such transfer is without the previous permission of the State Government, it is null and void and mortgagee is liable to be evicted and the land has to be resumed by the Government for restoration to the grantee.

Therefore, following this decision, since the plaintiff transferee acquired the said land and mango trees by way of the said transfer made in his favour by the defendant without the permission of the Government, the said transfer shall have to be held 'null and void' conveying no right, title or interest in such land by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. ……………………. Further, Section 5(3) provides that where any granted land is in the possession of a person other than the original grantee or his legal heir it shall be presumed, until contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by transfer which is 'null and void' under the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978. This being so, the burden is heavy on the plaintiff to prove that the said mortgage was not obtained by him in contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978."

If for any reason, the taluk office do not have the record relating to the grant of land in question then the respondents have to rebuild the records and find out the date of grant, nature of grant and to whom the land was granted. - JUSTICE NAGAMOHANDAS

Chinnappa Vs. The Special Deputy Commissioner and Ors. Hon’ble Justice: H.N. Nagamohan Das, J. Date of Judgement: 18/12/2009 Citation: 2010 (1) KarLJ 671, Writ Petition No. 15427 of 2009, SOURCE: KARNATAKA HIGH COURT “The Assistant Commissioner vide order dated 12-6-2003 as per Annexure-K rejected the claim of petitioner mainly on the ground that the original grant darkast records are not available in the Taluk Office. In appeal, the Deputy Commissioner confirmed the order of Assistant Commissioner under the impugned order dated 4-4-2007 - Annexure-L. Hence, this writ petition. ….. The PTCL Act is a social welfare legislation. The object of PTCL Act is to see that the land granted to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe persons are retained in their hands. If for any reason, the taluk office do not have the record relating to the grant of land in question then the respondents have to rebuild the records and find out the date of grant, nature of grant and to whom the land was granted. Further, the respondents have to secure the original grant/darkast register, saguvali chit register, kimath register etc., and verify the same. In the instant case the respondents without undertaking such an exercise committed an illegality in dismissing the claim of petitioner only on the ground that the grant darkast records are not available. On this ground the impugned orders are liable to be quashed.”


Smt. Jayamma W/o Siddegowda Vs. The Assistant Commissioner, Date of Judgement: 13/01/2010 Mandya Hon’ble Justice: Manjula Chellur and A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ. Writ Appeal No. 2860/2009 SOURCE: KARNATAKA HIGH COURT WEBSITE “From the record it is clear that, the grant was made in favour of the father of 4th respondent, who was a member of the Scheduled Caste. The grant was free of consideration. Rule 43(8) of the Land Grant Rules stipulate that the grant made free of consideration was net alienable for a period of 20 years from the date of grant i.e., in respect of the grants made between 04 08.1953 to 05.07.1955. The grant in favour of the 4th respondent has been made on 25.05.1955 and hence the non-alienation period in terms of the Rules is 20 years. Always the law/rules prevail and not the executive acts, when there is a conflict.”