GOVERNMENT LAND SHALL BE DISPOSED BY ONLY PUBLIC AUCTION
AFTER 08-05-2007 FROM KARNATAKA LAND REVENUE AMENDMENT ACT 2005
"69A. Disposal of lands or other property belonging to the State Government by public auction.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 of the Act subject to such rules as may be prescribed in this behalf the State Government or the Authorised Officer may dispose of valuable land or other property belonging to the State Government under section 67 or otherwise by public auction.
Provided that heritage sites and buildings or relics shall not be disposed under this section. (2) The Deputy Commissioner or the Authorised Officer may by order confirm the sale under sub-section (1) on the expiration of thirty days from the date of sale of the immovable property.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this section valuable land means those lands which if auctioned shall fetch values far above the normal price."
"69A. Disposal of lands or other property belonging to the State Government by public auction.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 of the Act subject to such rules as may be prescribed in this behalf the State Government or the Authorised Officer may dispose of valuable land or other property belonging to the State Government under section 67 or otherwise by public auction.
Provided that heritage sites and buildings or relics shall not be disposed under this section. (2) The Deputy Commissioner or the Authorised Officer may by order confirm the sale under sub-section (1) on the expiration of thirty days from the date of sale of the immovable property.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this section valuable land means those lands which if auctioned shall fetch values far above the normal price."
REVENUE AUTHORITIES ARE DUTY BOUND TO MAKE REVENUE RECORD ENTRIES - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Mahadevappa And Ors. vs State Of Karnataka By Its Secretary, Revenue Department And Ors. ILR 2008 KAR 1750 It is needles to say it is duty bound on the part of the revenue authorities and the Sub-Registrar as per Section 128(4) to invariably intimate the fact of transfer of interest or ownership from the first party to the second party to the concerned revenue authorities so that concerned revenue authorities will make the mutation entries in the concerned register and also proper entries in the revenue register after following the procedure as per Section 129 of the Land Revenue Act. Ultimately, any intended purchaser would get himself verified about the status of the property whether before he could go for any such purchase or seek for transfer of interest from the person who has got a right, title and interest so that he will not be mislead. For want of these entries in the revenue records and for want of proper information from the concerned Department of the Government, often purchasers are being mislead and get into problems and hardship. It is high time to intimate the Revenue Department and the concerned Department to meticulously follow the procedure as provided under Section 128 & 129 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act and also it should be made mandatory as a matter of responsibility on the part of the Government to save the public from the precarious situation and also there shall be timely action by the revenue authorities without there being any delay on their part in making entries in the mutation register and other registers in the revenue office and in the Corporation/Municipality in city limits to avoid future complications.
JUSTICE N KUMAR OBSERVES LAND MAFIA- LEGAL ADVISORS MAFIA- GOVERNMENT INACTION- GOOD DEVELOPMENTS
In The State Of Karnataka VS H.B. Munivenkatappa 2007 (4) KarLJ 439 JUSTICE N KUMAR OBSEERVED:-
GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC DUPED BY OFFICIALS
“The officials of the Government, the advocates who are conducting the cases on behalf of the Government and others have let down the interest of the Government and public. Under these circumstances, I am of the view it would be appropriate to refer the entries in the original ledger book where Form No. 7 is noted and orders passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal, Bangalore South Taluk in all those cases at any rate as contained in this book, for enquiry to the aforesaid committee which may throw some light on the way the tribunal, the Government officials and others have discharged their duties in protecting public property, and if illegalities are found to take steps to restore the land to the Government.”
DO NOT REGULARIZE INJUSTICE ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS REMOVE INJUSTICE
“The judiciary is respected not on account of its power to regularize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. If appeals brought by the Government are lost on account of delay, no person is individually affected, but what in the ultimate analysis suffers is, the public interest. The law of Limitation is no doubt the same for private citizen as well as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take the responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But some what different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to the acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. On account of impersonal machinery, no one Page 0797 incharge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing and passing on the buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represent collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Refusing to condone the delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out, at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a case would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. The technicalities of procedure should yield to considerations which would promote public interest and substantial justice. The Courts should decide the matters on merits, unless it is hopelessly without any merit.”
DECREE WITHOUT JURISDICTION IS NULLITY
“It is also a fundamental principle, that a decree passed by the Court without jurisdiction is a nullity. Its validity can be set up whenever and where ever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction whether it is technical or territorial or whether it is in respect of subject matter of action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree and such defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. Nullity has to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the power of the court passing the decree and not merely avoidable decree. If the decree strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court or the Court lacks jurisdiction, it strikes at the very root of the authority to pass the order or the decree. The decree passed by such a Court is a nullity and non est.”
PUBLIC PROPERTY NOT HANDLED PROPERLY
In The State Of Karnataka VS H.B. Munivenkatappa 2007 (4) KarLJ 439 JUSTICE N KUMAR OBSEERVED:- “The material on record discloses at every stage the persons who were entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the public property have let down the Government. The way the litigation has been fought and the way the Government representatives and their counsel have let down the public interest, is shocking. When the matter was brought to the notice of the Lokayuktha, it issued a clean chit to those officials saying that the public interest has not suffered. There cannot be a worst situation than this. A mighty Government rendered helpless by such advise and breach of trust. If the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal exists as contended by the plaintiff, it is clear that the Assistant Commissioner who is the Chairman of the Tribunal has failed to notice the aforesaid statutory provisions which confers no right to the vested land in the inamdar and the Tribunal to grant occupancy rights in respect of a tank bed. He is a party to this order of grant granting public property to the plaintiff. When the suit was filed for Page 0798 declaration of title on the basis of the said document though appropriate defence were taken in the written statement, the same is not pursued as they were expected to and in the result a decree came to be passed. Though it was stated in the written statement filed in the suit, steps would be taken to challenge the order of the Land Tribunal, no writ petition was filed, a serious lapse. The learned Government Advocate who conducted the case on behalf of the Government instead of advising suitably the Government to prefer an appeal, gave his opinion that it is not a fit case for an appeal. The Director of Public Prosecution (Civil) who was expected to apply his mind and take an independent decision has failed to discharge his duties and he has concurred with the opinion given by the learned Government Advocate not to prefer an appeal. It appears thereafter the concerned file did not reach the Law Department nor any opinion was sought from the Law Department. Even when the matter was being agitated in this Court in writ proceedings, advocate who was incharge of these matters appears to have not applied his mind properly.”
PRAISE FOR GOOD OFFICIALS – ALL ARE NOT BAD – LOKAYUKTA’S BLINDNESS
“However, it is heartening to note that there are some officials still left in the administration who have a commitment in life and who think about public good. The said officiate at the relevant point of time did notice that the schedule land is a Government land and it is a 'sarkari kere' and mutation entries cannot be made in the name of the decree holder. They resisted the attempt to get the mutation entries made. It is only when arrest warrants were issued against them for disobeying the decree of a Civil Court, the Government realised the blunder they have committed and the Law Officers who betrayed its trust. Then they have approached the Law Department, sought for their opinion and on consideration of the entire material the Law Department gave its advice on 22.12.2003 to the effect that it is a fit case for preferring the appeal. On 7.1.2004 the Government accorded sanction to prefer the appeal. When Lokayukta was requested to investigate the circumstances in which no appeal was filed earlier, the Lokayukta had issued an endorsement to the effect that there are no laches on the part of any Government servant and that it appears that no loss has been caused to the State. It is thereafter the appeal is filed with an application for condonation of delay.”
LEGAL ADVISORS OF GOVERNMENT GOT BLOW IN THIS CASE
“A beginner in the legal profession would know, that against a judgment and decree of declaration of title, an appeal lies and not a revision. This is the type of legal advise which has been given to the Government over a period of nearly ten years. "It is a case of salt having lost its savour". The judicial Page 0799 process is used to acquire rights over the Government property, a clear case of abuse of judicial process.”
GOVERNMENT FACING CHALLENGES WITH IN/OUT IN LEGAL FIELD
“Karnataka being one of the progressive State in the Union of India, Bangalore being the center of attraction to the whole world, unfortunately, the professional legal advise given to the Government is of this nature. It is no wonder that the value of landed property in Bangalore is more than gold and the real estate business is the most thriving business in the city of Bangalore. The State Legislature has to appoint a Committee to go into this problem of grabbing of Government lands which runs to thousands of acres involving crores of rupees. The said Committee has submitted an interim report blaming the officials and lawyers in-charge of the case and others being a privy to these illegal activities right under the nose of the seat of power. Now that multinational companies are competing with each other to have a foot hold in Bangalore, with the liberalization, globalization and privatization, having its impact on all walks of life in the society, whether the Government is capable of meeting the challenges in the field of law and in protecting its people and its properties, with the kind of legal assistance they have. There is no dearth for legal talent in the State. The problem is the mind to utilise the said talent. This case should be an eye opener to the Government. It is for them to take appropriate steps to overhaul their revenue, and legal department, including the quality of the Advocates they choose to represent them in Courts, if the Government is sincere in protecting the public and its properties.”
CONDONING THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL
The Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1353 held as under: The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of Justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
In Ramlal, & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [(1962) 2 SCR 762], it was laid down that in showing sufficient cause to condone the delay, it is not necessary that the applicant/appellant has to explain whole of the period between the date of the judgment till the date of filing the appeal. It is sufficient that the applicant/appellant would explain the delay caused by the period between the last of the dates of limitation and the date on which the appeal/application is actually filed. What constitute sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules.
In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra [AIR 1976 SC 237], Supreme Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystalized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction.
In Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram [AIR 1917 PC 156] it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal.
In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari & Ors. [(1969) 1 SCR 1006], a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.
In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi & Ors. [(1979) 3 SCR 694] which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy the default in delay was condoned.
In Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1970) 2 SCR 90], Supreme Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a devise tn cover an ulterior purpose. in that case it was held that the mistake committed by the counsel was bona fide and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive.
In State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe & Ors. [(1981) Supp. SCC 72], it was held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependant upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
In Smt. Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath [(1982) 3 SCR 366], it was held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. This Court under Art.136 can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and case was remitted for decision on merits.
In O.P. Kathpaliaa v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) & Ors. [(1984) 4 SCC 66], a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned.
In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantrag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. [(1987) 2 SCC 107], a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery ( no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represent collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay was accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties.
In Smt. Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra [(1987) Supp. SCC 338], Supreme Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice- oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law.
In G. Ramegowda, Major & Ors, v. Spl, Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore [(1988) 2 SCC 142], it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned.
In Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda v. Union of India & Ors. [(1991) 1 SCC 174], a Bench of three Judges of Supreme Court held that the bona fides of the parties are to be tested on merits and the delay of 1146 to 1079 days was not condoned on the ground that the parties approached the court after decision on merits was allowed in other cases by this Court. Therefore, it was held that it did not furnish a ground for condonation of delay under Section 5.
In Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India [(1993) 1 SCC 572], it was held that it is not at all a fit case where in the anxiety to render justice to a party so that a just cause is not defeated, a pragmatic view should be taken by the court in considering sufficing cause for condonation of the delay under Section 5. It was held that when the party has come with a false plea to get rid of the bar of limitation, the court should not encourage such person by condoning the delay and result in the bar of limitation pleaded by the opposite party. This Court, therefore, refused to condone the delay in favour of the party who came forward with false plea.
In M/s. Shakambari & Co. v. Union of India [(1993) Supp. 1 SCS 487], a Bench of three Judges held that delay caused in filing the appeal due to fluctuation in laying down the law was held to be a sufficient cause and delay of 14 days was condoned.
In Ram Krishan & Anr. v. U.P. State Roadways Transport Corpn. & Anr. [(1994) Supp. 2 SCC 507], Supreme Court had held that although the story put forward by the applicant for not filing the application for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act within the period of limitation was not found convincing but keeping in vies the facts and circumstances and cause of justice, the delay was condoned and the appeal was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal to dispose it on merits.
In Warlu v. Gangotribai & Anr. [(1995) Supp. 1 SCC 37] a three-Judge Bench condoned delay of 11 years in filing the special leave petition.
Following these Obove judgments, the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1623 , has held as under: It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party or the State - are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the cours or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case for condoning the delay. The delay is accordingly condoned. The High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible.
REVENUE DOCUMENTS ARE NOT DOCUMENT OF TITLE
AIR 2008 SC 901 , GURUNATH MANOHAR PAVASKAR &; ORS VS NAGESH SIDDAPPA NAVALGUND &; ORS :- A revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof both forward and backward can also be raised under s.110 of the Evidence Act.
Coparcenary is a creature of Hindu law and cannot be ,created
In a case of BHAGWAN DAYAL Vs. MST. REOTI DEVI AIR 1962 SC 287 it is observed as follows: “Coparcenary is a creature of Hindu law and cannot be ,created by agreement of parties except in the case of reunion. It is a corporate body or a family unit. The law also recognizes a branch of the family as a subordinate corporate body. The said family unit, whether the larger one or the subordinate one, can acquire, hold and dispose of family property subject to the limitations laid down by law. Ordinarily, the manager, or by consent, express or implied, of the members of the family, any other member or members can carry on business or acquire property, subject to the limitations laid down by the said law, for or, on behalf of the family. Such business or property would be the business or property, of the, family. The identity of the members of the, family is not completely last in the family. One or more - members of :that family can start a business or acquire property without the aid of the joint family Property, but such business or acquisition would his or their acquisition. The business so started or property so acquired can be thrown into the common stock or blended with the joint family property in which case the said property becomes the estate of the joint family. But he or they need not do so, in which case the said property would be his or their self- acquisition, and succession to such property would be governed not by' the law of joint family but only by the law of inheritance. In such a case if a property was jointly acquired by them, it would not be governed by the law of joint family ; for Hindu law does not recognize some of the members of a joint family belonging to different branches, or even to a single branch, as a corporate unit.. Therefore, the rights inter se. between the. members who have acquired the said property would be subject to the terms of the agreement where under it was acquired.”
WHEN THERE IS PARTITION DISPUTE REVENUE RECORDS SHALL NOT BE CHANGED SAYS KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
Karnataka Government Secretariat,
M.S.Building,
Bangalore,
M.S.Building,
Bangalore,
Circular Number No. RD 79 MRR 2002 Dated: 20th February 2003.
S l No 1860/Section RTC
Subject Reg- Co-parceners
CIRCULAR
CIRCULAR
There is some confusion in recording the name of the purchaser in the Mutation Register on the sale of undivided interest of one of the Co-parceners of the land. Some Revenue Inspectors are insisting upon the landholder to first get the land partitioned and then approach for mutation; whereas some Revenue Inspectors are effecting mutations by recording the name of the purchaser and even giving separate rights to the purchaser by effecting phodi in respect of the land purchased by him.
In a case reported in ILR 1999 KAR 1484 the Hon'ble High Court has held as follows:
"No doubt, as pointed by Shri Adhyapak the respondent 3 and 4 acquire the undivided interest of the 2nd respondent in respect of the land bearing sy.no.772/2. It is well settled that so long as the partition of the family properties does not take place, what the respondents 3 and 4 acquire in the land in question is only the undivided interest of the 2nd respondent. Under these circumstances, it was not permissible for the Tahsildar to enter the name of respondents 3 and 4 in respect of the land in question on the basis of the sale deed – Annexure A and give separate sub-numbers as has been done in Annexure-E. If the respondents 3 and 4 have acquired right, title and interest of the 2nd respondent in respect of the land in question, the remedy open to the respondents 3 and 4 is to seek partition of the family properties. Till that is not done, it is not permissible for the Revenue Authorities to enter the name of the purchaser in respect of the joint family properties".
It, therefore, implies that it is not correct for the Revenue Department to enter the name of purchaser in such cases where one of the Co-parceners sells his undivided interest. The purchaser will have to seek for partition of the family properties. Till it is done, revenue authorities should not enter name of the purchaser in respect of joint family properties in the mutation register.
However, if all the joint holders agree to sell a portion of their joint property to a purchaser then the authorities can certainly enter the name of the purchaser in respect of the extent purchased by him. In such cases the remaining property continued to be joint in the name of the joint owners.
Further, if one of the Co-parceners sells his undivided interest with the consent of all the other joint owners then his name can be removed and the name of the purchaser can be inserted. To illustrate these points following examples are given:
Let us presume there are 3 joint owners holding 6 acres of land. If all of them jointly sell one acre of land to D then it is permissible for the revenue authorities to mutate one acre of land in favour of D. Then RTC would be as follows:
A, B, C – 5 acres (jointly owned) D – 1 acre
In the second case, if C sells away his portion of land, which, for the sake of argument, say one and half acre (as agreed by all 3 owners) then RTC would look as follows: A, B – 4.20 acres (jointly owned) D – 1.20 acre
In both these cases it may noted that the consent of the other joint owners either at the time of executing sale deed or at the time of effecting mutation is necessary.
Above guidelines be kept in mind by all the concerned. This Circular is also available at the Revenue Department Internet site
http://www.revdept.kar.nic.in.
(RAJEEV CHAWLA)
Additional Secretary to Government
Revenue Department (Land Reforms)
(RAJEEV CHAWLA)
Additional Secretary to Government
Revenue Department (Land Reforms)
To,
All Deputy Commissioners.
Foot Notes
For any suggestions / clarifications, please send mail to Mr. Rajeev Chawla (Additional Secretary)
All Deputy Commissioners.
Foot Notes
For any suggestions / clarifications, please send mail to Mr. Rajeev Chawla (Additional Secretary)
MUSLIM LAW OF SUCCESSION TO PROPERTY
In a case before Karnataka High Court in Smt. Ashabi vs Smt. Faziyabi And Ors. (ILR 2004 KAR 3599) "A person who according to Muslim law is an heir of the deceased remains so and gets his legal due. He or she cannot be excluded either by other heirs and survivors of the deceased or even under a specific direction left in that behalf by the deceased himself. One can be excluded from inheritance only under a rule of Muslim law, if applicable in India. It is also well settled that only that relative can be an heir of the deceased who is alive at the moment of the latter's death. A person who died before the deceased cannot be his heir……………….It is a well- recognised proposition of law that the estate of a deceased Mohammedan devolves on his heirs in specific shares at the moment of his death."
The Shariat Act was passed by the Central Legislature in 1937. It became for the first time extended to Part "B" States by virtue of the Central Act 48 of 1959 (which came into force on February 1, 1960), called the Miscellaneous Personal Laws (Extension) Act, 1959, which amended its extent clause in such a way as to apply the statute to whole of India except to Jammu and Kashmir. The principal operative section of the said Act is section 2, which reads : "2. Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all question regarding intestate succession, special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of Personal Law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talaq ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubarrat, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties and wakfs (other then charities and charitable institutions and charitable and religious endowments) the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)."
Supreme Court in Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa. AIR 1961 SC 808, Interpreting the force or effect of the words in section 2 of the Shariat Act to the effect that in all matters enumerated therein, the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law, their Lordships state that the statute would apply not only to suits and proceedings instituted subsequent to the coming into force of the statute but also to suits and proceedings pending on that date whether in original courts or tribunals or in appeal.
Inheritance is an integral part of Shariah Law and its application in Islamic society is a mandatory aspect of the divine teaching of Islam. Muslims inherit from each other as stated in the Qur'an: “ لِّلرِّجَالِ نَصيِبٌ مِّمَّا تَرَكَ الْوَالِدَانِ وَالأَقْرَبُونَ وَلِلنِّسَاء نَصِيبٌ مِّمَّا تَرَكَ الْوَالِدَانِ وَالأَقْرَبُونَ مِمَّا قَلَّ مِنْهُ أَوْ كَثُرَ نَصِيبًا مَّفْرُوضًا ” {“4:7 There is a share for men and a share for women from what is left by parents and those nearest related, whether, the property be small or large - a legal share.“} [An-Nisa 4:7] Hence, for Muslims in India there is a legal share for relatives of the deceased in his estate/property. When a person dies there are four rights that need to be performed his property:
1. Pay his/her funeral and burial expenses
2. Pay his/her debts
3. Execute his Will/bequest (max 1/3 of his/her property)
4. Distribute remainder of his/her estate/property according to Shariah Law
In relation to inheritance, Mohammad said: Narrated Ibn 'Abbas: “The Prophet said, "Give the Fara'id (the shares of the inheritance that are prescribed in the Qur'an) to those who are entitled to receive it. Then whatever remains, should be given to the closest male relative of the deceased." Thus it can be seen that under Muslim Law no stranger outside the family shall succeed under Shariat Law of Inheritance or Under Quranic Commands.
PRESUMPTION OF ENTRIES IN REVENUE RECORD - HOW FAR BE PRESUMED
In a case before Karnataka High court in Bhimappa Channappa Kapali (Deceased) By L.Rs And Ors. vs Bhimappa Satyappa Kamagouda And Ors (ILR 2002 KAR 3055,) it is vehemently held that “Though Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act which deals with presumption regarding entries in the records providing that an entry in the record of rights and a certified entry in the register of mutations or in the patta book shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor, before that presumption could be raised it should be shown that such entries are duly certified entries under Section 129 and thereafter such entries are made in the record of rights. Prior to the making of the entries in the name of the appellant, the entries in the revenue records stood in the name of Gerappa, the husband of Shivawwa. After the death of Gerappa, Shivawwa has executed a registered gift deed in favour of the first respondent. However, first respondent acquired a right in the land in question by virtue of a registered document. The registering authority under Section 128 of the Land Revenue Act is obliged to inform the concerned revenue authorities about the acquisition of right by first respondent in the land in question. Before a change of entry is made, the revenue authorities were under an obligation to notify the owner of the land in question and only after hearing his objections and after enquiry and passing an order in the prescribed manner they shall certify the entry and thereafter make the necessary entry in the register of mutations. If entries are made in this manner after complying with the provisions of Sections 128 and 129, under Section 133 the Court shall presume such entries to be true until the contrary is proved. In the instant case before altering the entries admittedly no notice was given to the first respondent, no enquiry has been held and the proceedings pending between the parties make it clear that the entries made in the revenue records are illegal and these facts and circumstances are sufficient to rebut such presumption.”
REVENUE COURTS TO DECIDE ON UNDISPUTED FACTS
In C.N. Nagendra Singh vs The Special Deputy Commissioner And Ors. (ILR 2002 KAR 2750) The Honble High court of Karnataka Held that : “The decision of the Revenue Courts has to be necessarily based on the undisputed facts.”
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